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INTRODUCTION  
 
Recent technological advancements in media have spurned 
unprecedented growth in the ever-changing industries of music, 
television and motion pictures. Over 22 million Americans ages 18—
39 own portable MP3 players or iPods®.1 In fact, 19% of all 
Americans under the age of 30 own these relatively new devices.2  
Millions of Americans watch digitally recorded television programs or 
movies thanks to “On-Demand” services such as TiVo®, Digital Video 
Recorders or VHS tapes.3 In fact, countless numbers of people have 
recorded their favorite movie or television program on a VHS or 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology.  
1Lee Rainie, PIP Comments: iPods and MPS Players Storm the Market, PEW 
INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, February 14, 2005, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/p/1047/pipcomments.asp (last visited April 15, 
2006).  
2Id. 
3BILL ROSE & JOE LENSKI, ARBITRON/EDISON MEDIA RESEARCH, INTERNET 
AND MULTIMEDIA 2005: THE ON-DEMAND MEDIA CONSUMER (2005), available at 
http://www.edisonresearch.com/home/archives/Internet%202005%20Summary%20
Final.pdf (last visited June 25, 2006). 
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Betamax video tape daily since the United States Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc.4   
However great these technological advancements have impacted 
the American economy by making entertainment more readily 
available to consumers and creating additional markets for producers, 
these advancements have also threatened – and continue to threaten – 
the  delicate balance between rights in copyrighted material and 
technological innovation. This article, inspired by the Seventh 
Circuit’s recent decision in BMG Music v. Gonzalez5, analyzes this 
balance, and looks toward the future of the relationship between 
copyright law and technological advancement in the Seventh Circuit.  
First, this Article will present a brief history of copyright law in 
the United States, which has been forced to evolve as newer and more 
efficient technologies have developed. With the advent of these new 
technologies, such as peer-to-peer file sharing networks, iPods and 
MP3 players, right-holders of copyrighted material face unrestricted 
and widespread dissemination of their works. However, the public’s 
use of copyrighted material through peer-to-peer file sharing networks 
(P2P) has upset this delicate balance between the rights owners 
possess in their works and the benefit of open and public access to 
them as a result of the overwhelming efficiency in dissemination that 
this technology offers.  
Second, this article examines the recent Gonzalez decision, the 
apex of this conflict on an individual level in the Seventh Circuit. 
Companies such as BMG, the plaintiff in Gonzalez, have become 
increasingly weary of sophisticated infringement technologies such as 
P2P file sharing networks, and have begun to target individual 
copyright infringers such as Cecilia Gonzalez.  
Lastly, this article will address the problems the recording 
industries and consumers face in the years to come when dealing with 
online music access. The impossibility of litigating each and every 
case against every individual infringer, or even filing suit against every 
infringer, is readily apparent to the majority of internet users, thereby 
                                                 
4464 U.S. 417 (1984).  
5430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005).  
2
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fostering an “it will not happen to me” attitude in the minds of the P2P 
communities. Finding the right remedy to this problem can eliminate 
copyright infringement in P2P file sharing communities and, 
hopefully, will enable this technology to benefit both sides of the 
conflict.  
 
I. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
A. The Early Days of Copyright Law 
 
The Constitution of the United States provides Congress with the 
power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing 
for limited times to authors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries.”6  The Copyright Act of 1790 granted 
American authors the right to print, re-print or publish their work for 
fourteen years and to renew that protection for an additional fourteen 
years.7  The Copyright Act sought to provide an incentive to authors, 
artists, and scientists to create original works by providing creators 
with a monopoly; however, this monopoly was limited in order to 
“stimulate creativity and the advancement of science and the arts 
through wide public access of the works . . .”8    
In 1841, the Massachusetts Supreme Court heard a dispute 
brought by the owner and editor of a collection of George 
Washington’s letters after those letters were used by an author in a 
book about Washington’s life.9  Justice Story, delivering the opinion 
for the Court, found that the author had infringed on the owner’s 
copyright when he published a large number of these letters in his 
book.10  The author argued that his use of the letters was justified and 
                                                 
6U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
7Association of Research Libraries, Washington D.C., A History of Copyright 
Law in the United States, (2002), www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/timeline.html (last 
visited June 25, 2006).  
8Id. (emphasis added).  
9Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841).  
10Folsom, 9 F. Cas at 349.  
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that he had a right to use the letters for his original work.11  Justice 
Story disagreed, holding that if so much of a work is taken “that the 
value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the 
original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by 
another, that is sufficient . . . to constitute piracy pro tanto.”12   
Further, the court held that the question of piracy depends upon 
the balance of: 
 
the comparative use made in one of the materials of the 
other; the nature, extent and value of the materials thus 
used; the objects of each work; and the degree to which 
each writer may be fairly presumed to have resorted to 
the same common sources of information, or to have 
exercised the same common diligence in the selection 
and arrangement of the materials.13   
 
In 1909, Congress revised the Copyright Act of 1790 and for the 
first time addressed the rights a composer holds in his music. The 
main purpose, Congress said, was: 
 
in expanding copyright protection accorded to music 
has been to give the composer an adequate return for 
the value of his composition, and it has been a serious 
and difficult task to combine the protection of the 
composer with the protection of the public, and to so 
frame an act that it would accomplish the double 
purpose of securing to the composer an adequate return 
for all use made of his composition and at the same 
time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies, 
which might be founded upon the very rights granted to 
the composer for the purpose of protecting his rights.14 
                                                 
11Id. at 342-44.  
12Id. at 348.  
13Id. at 344.  
14Association of Research Libraries,  supra note 7.  
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B. Moving Toward the Modern Years  
 
This “difficult task” recognized by Congress in 1909 would only 
increase with the development of new technology. In 1973, the 
photocopier made its way into the realm of copyright law. In Williams 
& Wilkins Co. v. United States,15 the National Institutes of Health and 
the National Library of Medicine photocopied articles in medical 
journals published by plaintiff and gave them to physicians and 
medical researchers for use in their professional work.16  The Court of 
Claims opined that medical research and medicine in general would be 
harmed if this were found to be infringement.17 In the decision, Judge 
Davis, while pleading for congressional treatment of this new 
technology in copyright law, held that that use of the photocopier to 
copy this important medical information constituted fair use, but also 
specifically noted that plaintiff failed to demonstrate any harm from its 
use.18 
This “fair” use the Supreme Court talked about was a major part 
of the revisions included in the Copyright Act of 1976. This Act 
superseded all previous copyright law and was brought about in part 
because of new technological advancements and their impact on what 
might be copyrighted.19  This revision codified for the first time the 
“fair use” doctrine, and also extended copyright to unpublished 
works.20   
The “fair use” doctrine provides that the “fair use of a copyrighted 
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or 
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
                                                 
15480 F. 2d 1345 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  
16Williams, 480 F. 2d at 1347-48.  
17Id. at 1354.  
18Id. at 1353-54.  
19Association of Research Libraries, supra note 7.  
20Id.  
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infringement of copyright.”21 Four factors are determinative of 
whether an act constitutes fair use: the purpose and character of the 
use, nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of 
the portion used in relation to the whole, and the effect of the use on 
the potential market.22  This doctrine is subject to interpretation for 
each specific case before a court.23 Because of that, its application is 
difficult, and both the legislature and the courts have recognized as 
much: 
 
The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 
offers some guidance to users in determining when the 
principles of the doctrine apply. However, the endless 
variety of situations and combinations of circumstances 
that can rise in particular cases precludes the 
formulation of exact rules in the statute. The bill 
endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial 
doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze 
the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of 
rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad 
statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the 
criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt 
the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case 
basis.24 
 
C. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc. 
 
When Sony introduced the Betamax to the market in 1975, this 
case-specific nature of the fair use doctrine would play a major role in 
the advancement of this new technology. Industry heads feared that it, 
and subsequent VCR technology, would encourage consumers to copy 
and “library” movies and programs from television, “thereby reducing 
                                                 
2117 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  
22Id.  
23Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984).  
24Sony, 464 U.S. at 450 (1984).  
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the demand for future syndication of these programs.”25  In fact, the 
head of the Motion Picture Association of America at the time, Jack 
Valenti, famously testified in 1982 to the House of Representatives 
that “the VCR is to the American film producer and the American 
public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.”26 
It did not take long for the Courts to become involved in the 
Betamax conflict. In 1979, the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California heard argument and ruled in the case of 
Universal Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America.27 Because of the 
importance of this case, it and its subsequent decisions in the United 
States Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court will be 
discussed at length.  
In Sony, plaintiff Universal Studios alleged that the use of the 
Betamax to record telecasts and to copy audio-visual material to be 
viewed at a later time infringed on its copyrights and that Sony was 
either a direct or contributory infringer for distributing the Betamax to 
individual consumers.28  Universal sought injunctive relief to prevent 
any future copyright infringement.29 
                                                 
25Fred von Lohmann, iPods, Tivo and Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 
Presented at the 2005 Fordham Intellectual Property Conference (March 31-April 1, 
2005), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/courses/fall05/ipscholarship/Von%20Lo
hmann%20Fair%20Use%20As%20Innovation%20Policy.pdf at 10 (last visited June 
25, 2006).  
26Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong. (2d Sess. 1982) (statement of 
Jack Valenti), available at http://cryptome.org/hrcw-hear.htm (last visited June 25, 
2006).  
27480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal., 1979).  
28Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 432. 
 Curiously, before Sony was filed, Universal Studios began marketing its 
products on pre-recorded discs and planned to release these discs before and after the 
pictures were released. Id. at 433. Perhaps Universal Studios was concerned with 
Sony’s entrance into the home-video market; alleging and proving copyright 
infringement could have been a way to monopolize its new dissemination tactic.  
29Id. at 442.  
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Sony marketed the Betamax as a device capable of recording 
favorite programs or building a library of recorded works.30 Its 
advertising strategy also suggested to the public that it record “novels 
for television” and “classic movies.”31 None of the advertisements 
warned the public that recording copyrighted shows could constitute 
infringement.32 However, the Betamax instruction booklet did make it 
known that “[t]elevision programs, films, videotapes and other 
materials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of such 
material may be contrary to the provisions of the United States 
copyright laws.”33 
Both Universal Studios and Sony conducted surveys regarding the 
usage of the Betamax.34 Some notable findings revealed that: 
 • 75.4% of owners use their machines to record for time-
shifting purposes half or most of the time. Sony’s survey showed that 
96% of the Betamax owners had used the machine to record programs 
they otherwise would have missed.35 
 • 55.8% of users said there were 10 or fewer tapes in 
their possession. In Sony’s survey, of the total programs viewed by 
interviewees, 70.4% had been viewed only that one time and for 
57.9%, there were no plans for further viewing.36 
 • According to Universal Studio’s survey, 58.3% of the 
owners eliminate commercials from the recording either “sometimes,” 
“rarely,” or “never”; 56.1% use the fast-forward function to pass 
commercials either “sometimes,” “rarely,” or “never.” Defendant’s 
interviewees bypassed commercials 24.6% of the time.37  
                                                 
30Id. at 436.  
31Id.  
32Id.  
33Id.  
34Id.  
35Id. at 438.  
36Id.  
37Id. at 439.  
8
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 • 83.2% of the interviewees reported that their frequency 
of going to the theatre to view movies was unaffected by the 
Betamax.38 
Universal conceded that the Betamax had not harmed its business 
relationships nor caused it any economic damage.39 Further, expert 
testimony presented by Universal was inconclusive as to when or after 
what amount of sales the Betamax would cause Universal any 
recognizable harm.40  
Before rendering its opinion, the District Court opined that: 
 
[t]he ramifications of this new technology are greater 
 than the boundaries of this lawsuit. A court reviewing the 
 limited claims of specified parties in a particular factual 
 setting cannot and should not undertake the role of a 
 government commission or legislative body exploring and 
 evaluating all the uses and consequences of the videotape 
 recorder.41 
 
After a lengthy discussion of the Copyright Act of 1909 (of which 
some of the alleged infringement were governed), the Copyright Act 
of 1976 (which governed the remaining infringements), and the fair 
use doctrine, the court found that the 1971 Amendment to the 1909 
Copyright Act permitted home use audio recording.42  In fact, the court 
cited congressional discussions regarding this Amendment, one of 
which speaks volumes to the subject here. The Court’s citation of the 
discussion is as follows: 
 
When the 1971 Amendment reached the House floor, 
the question of noncommercial home recording was 
                                                 
38Id.  
39Id.  
40Id.  
41Id. at 442.  
42Id. at 444.  
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raised by Representative Kazen of Texas and answered 
by Representative Kastenmeier. Representative 
Kastenmeier was chairman of the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee responsible for the New Act, a sponsor 
of the general revision legislation, and a member of the 
Conference Committee which put the New Act in final 
form. The dialogue was as follows: 
 
MR. KAZEN. Am I correct in assuming that the bill 
protects copyrighted material that [i]s duplicated for 
commercial purposes only? 
 
MR. KASTENMEIER. Yes. 
 
MR. KAZEN. In other words, if your child were to 
Record off of a program which comes through the air 
on [t]he radio or Television, and then used it for her 
own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this 
would not be included under the penalties of this bill? 
 
MR. KASTENMEIER. This is not included in the bill. 
I am glad the gentleman raises the point. 
 
On page 7 of the report, under “Home Recordings,” 
Members will note that under the bill the same practice 
which prevails today is called for; namely, [t]his is 
considered both presently and under the proposed law 
to be fair use. The child does not do this for commercial 
purposes. This is made clear in the report.43 
 
This legislative history, the court noted, evidences “that, in 
balance, Congress did not find that protection of copyright holders’ 
rights over reproduction of their works was worth the privacy and 
enforcement problems which restraint of home-use recording would 
                                                 
43Id. at 446.  
10
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create.”44  This, the court held, was further evidence that the 1909 and 
1976 Copyright Acts permitted, under the fair use doctrine, home 
recording of both sound-recordings and audio-visual pictures.45   
In applying the four criteria of the fair use doctrine, the court 
found (1) that Universal Studios had admitted that there was no 
economic harm, (2) that because Universal derives the majority of its 
revenues from advertisements, the harm resulting from the 
infringement was even more speculative, (3) that because the use 
occurs within private homes, enforcement would be highly intrusive 
and practically impossible, and (4) that although the use of the works 
was substantial, it still constitutes fair use because “there is no 
accompanying reduction in the market for ‘plaintiff's original 
work.’”46 
 Universal appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit.47  The Ninth Circuit reversed, opining that: 
 
There is no clear legislative language indicating that 
home video recording is not within the exclusive rights 
granted by § 106. The statute itself and the House and 
Senate Reports accompanying the 1976 Act do not 
provide for a broad based home use exception. There 
was never a considered review of the home video 
recording problem. The statements supporting the 
district court’s conclusion hardly represent – when 
considered in the content in which they were made and 
in the context of the 20 year copyright revision process 
– a firm expression of Congressional intent to carve out 
a major exception to the copyright scheme.48 
 
                                                 
44Id. at 448.  
45Id. at 447.  
46Id. at 450-54.  
47Universal Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 
1981).  
48Sony, 659 F.2d at 968.  
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The court further dismissed the legislative history relied upon by 
the District Court, suggesting that it was not intended to apply to home 
video recording, because Congress was not considering home video 
recording during its discussions on the 1971 amendment.49 As such, 
the Ninth Circuit held that it was not fair use to record programs using 
the Betamax, and remanded to the District Court for purposes of 
developing appropriate remedies for copyright owners.50 
Immediately following the court’s decision, legislation was 
introduced addressing the problem.51 For example, one bill sought to 
exempt all private, noncommercial home recording from any liability 
for copyright infringement.52 A second bill sought to “grant users of 
video cassette recorders a compulsory license with royalties to be paid 
to copyright owners from the sale of machines and blank tapes.”53  
“The immediate and widespread interest in the Sony case is 
unprecedented in the history of copyright litigation.”54 Legislators 
feared that millions of private citizens could be subject to damages and 
that the manufacturers of the infringing products would go bankrupt.55   
Now it was Sony’s turn to appeal, and the Supreme Court 
accepted certiorari and heard the case of Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal Studios.56 The Supreme Court recognized that “the average 
member of the public uses a VTR principally to record a program he 
cannot view as it is being televised and then to watch it once at a later 
time,” thereby acknowledging the practice of time shifting.57 However, 
                                                 
49Id. at 968.  
50Id. at 972.  
51Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong. (2d Sess. 1982) (statement of 
Jack Valenti), available at http://cryptome.org/hrcw-hear.htm.  
52Id.  
53Id.  
54Id.  
55Id.  
56464 U.S. 417 (1984).  
57Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.  
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the Court noted that the Betamax was also used for “library building” 
and for “commercial skipping.”58      
Faced with this evidence, the court opined: 
 
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this 
 case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment 
 with constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers 
 may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of 
 copyrighted material. There is no precedent in the law of 
 copyright for imposition of vicarious liability on such a 
 theory.59 
 
The court also reasoned that the sale of copying equipment did not 
constitute contributory infringement if the product was widely used for 
non-infringing purposes.60 Because the Betamax allowed its customers 
to record non-copyrighted works as well as copyrighted ones, Sony 
could not be held liable for contributory copyright infringement.61 
Furthermore, in determining whether the use of the Betamax 
constituted fair use of the copyrighted works, the Supreme Court held 
that time-shifting constituted a fair use of the product because it 
enlarged the audience for the program.62 
 
II. LIFE AFTER SONY 
 
We should all be as lucky as Universal Studios. The VCR became 
an establishment in the homes of millions of American families, and 
the movie studios recognized the ability to capitalize on this fact.63  
The movie studios began to allow consumers to rent and purchase 
                                                 
58Id.  
59Id. at 437.  
60Id. at 442.  
61Id.  
62Id. at 443.  
63von Lohmann, supra note 25, at 11.  
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movies which created the home video market.64  According to Fred 
von Lohmann, this market accounts for almost twice as much revenue 
than that brought in by the box office today.65  The readily available 
material for fair use recording served as the “bait that persuaded 
American consumers to make the (initially) large investment in this 
new fair use technology.”66 
The Sony case represents the dilemma courts have been faced 
with when technology and copyright laws collide. Today, P2P file 
sharing technology could be called the Betamax of the 21st century 
when looked at in a copyright-technology framework. Because of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sony, a new market opened – and 
flourished – for the benefit of those trying to close that very market. If 
the courts or the legislature were able to find a way to open new 
markets for copyrighted music via P2P technology, perhaps the same 
results would follow for the recording industries.  
 
A. In re: Aimster 
 
Courts are again being faced with a rift between technology and 
copyright laws. The popularity of new devices such as iPods and MP3 
players have fostered online file sharing networks which are being 
used to fill these players with free, copyrighted music. 
In 2003, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this very 
issue in In re :Aimster.67 Numerous plaintiffs joined together to sue 
Aimster, an online file sharing network, for contributory and vicarious 
infringement of copyrights.68  The district court judge issued an 
injunction which effectively shut Aimster down pending the resolution 
of the suit, and the defendant appealed.69   
                                                 
64Id.  
65Id.  
66Id. 
67334 F. 3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).  
68Id. at 645.  
69Id.  
14
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The Seventh Circuit noted the high popularity of such online file 
sharing networks among teenagers and young adults.70 The Court also 
noted that if the music shared on these networks is copyrighted, 
sharing digital copies of this music infringes copyright.71 Because of 
the impossibility of suing all primary or direct infringers of 
copyrighted works, the Court acknowledged that the law allows 
rightholders to sue a contributor to the infringement instead.72 
In determining whether Aimster was a contributory infringer of 
copyrighted works, it was necessary for the Seventh Circuit to address 
exactly how the software works. The software could be downloaded 
for free from Aimster’s website and then the user registered on the 
system by entering a password and user name.73  After doing so, he or 
she could designate any other user as a “buddy” and was able to 
communicate directly with them, attaching any files he or she wanted 
to share with them.74  Because the songs were stored on the 
individuals’ computers, Aimster, the court opined, could not be 
considered a direct infringer of the copyrighted works.75   
However, the court recognized that the ability of a service 
provider like Aimster to prevent its customers from infringing is a 
factor to be considered in determining whether the provider is a 
contributory infringer.76 Further, the court held that when a supplier 
like Aimster is offering a product or service that has non-infringing as 
well as infringing uses, “some estimate of the respective magnitudes 
of these uses is necessary for a finding of contributory 
infringement.”77 
In addressing the respective arguments of the parties, the court 
noted that “to the recording industry, a single known infringing use 
                                                 
70Id.  
71Id.  
72Id.  
73Id. at 646.  
74Id.  
75Id.  
76Id. at 648.  
77Id.  
15
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brands the facilitator as a contributory infringer. To the Aimsters of 
this world, a single, non-infringing use provides complete immunity 
from liability. Neither is correct.”78 Because Aimster failed to provide 
any evidence of non-infringing uses, the court assumed that there was 
no such evidence.79 Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the 
lower court and upheld the injunction.80  
 
B. MGM v. Grokster 
 
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
MGM v. Grokster.81  In Grokster, copyright holders sued a software 
distributor, alleging the distributor was liable for copyright 
infringement because the software was intended to allow users to 
infringe copyrighted works.82 The issue on review was under what 
circumstances the distributor of a product capable of both lawful and 
unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright infringement by third 
parties using the product – similar to the issues addressed in Sony.83 
Grokster (and co-defendant Streamcast Networks, Inc.) distributed 
free software which allowed the public to download music through 
P2P file sharing networks.84 A study commissioned by MGM revealed 
that 90% of all works downloaded from the Grokster software were 
copyrighted works.85 Grokster argued, in Sony fashion, that its 
software was capable of significant non-infringing uses; therefore, it 
was not in violation of copyright law.86 
While Grokster’s argument may have sounded in Sony fashion, a 
clear distinction was made by the Supreme Court. When Grokster 
                                                 
78Id. at 651.  
79Id. at 653.  
80Id. at 655-56.  
81125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).  
82Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2766.  
83Id. at 2770.  
84Id.  
85Id.  
86Id. at 2272.  
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distributed its free software, it “clearly voiced the objective that 
recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each took active 
steps to encourage infringement.”87 In fact, when another file sharing 
system – Napster – was shut down by the Court, Grokster and 
Streamcast targeted its user base, going so far as to “introduce itself to 
some potential advertisers as a company ‘which is similar to what 
Napster was.’”88 It also “broadcast banner advertisements to users of 
other Napster-compatible software, urging them to adopt its 
[software].”89 A company email stated: 
 
We have put this network in place so that when Napster 
 pulls the plug on their free service . . . or if the Court 
 orders them shut down prior to that . . . we will be 
 positioned to capture the flood of their 32 million users 
 that will be actively looking for an alternative.90  
 
The defendants blatantly advertised that they sought to exploit the 
illegal uses of their software and that their goal was to get sued 
because “[i]ts the best way to get in the news.”91 No evidence was 
presented that Grokster or Streamcast made any effort to prohibit its 
users from downloading copyrighted materials.92 
The Supreme Court discussed the case in the context of the Sony 
decision and noted that in Sony, there was no evidence of intent by the 
defendants to promote copyright infringement, and there, the only 
possible way of imposing liability on Sony was for its distribution of 
the Betamax.93 Further, because the VCR was “capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses,” the Supreme Court held 
                                                 
87Id.  
88Id. at 2773.  
89Id.  
90Id. (internal citations omitted).  
91Id.  
92Id. at 2274.  
93Id. at 2777.  
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the manufacturer could not be liable solely on the basis of its 
distribution.94  
The Supreme Court in Grokster declined to limit the Sony 
decision; however, it noted that in Sony it was found that: 
 
[i]f vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this 
 case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment 
 with constructive knowledge of the potential for 
 infringement. Thus, where evidence goes beyond a 
 product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be 
 put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions 
 directed to promoting infringement, Sony’s staple-article 
 rule will not preclude liability.95 
  
The Supreme Court thereby adopted in Grokster this new 
“inducement” test, whereby a defendant who actively induces 
copyright infringement cannot claim protection under Sony.96 
However, the Court limited its hoding to only those situations in which 
actual inducement was shown, noting that: 
 
mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual 
 infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a 
 distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to 
 product distribution, such as offering customers technical 
 support or product updates, support liability in themselves. 
 The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on 
 purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus 
 does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or 
 discourage innovation having a lawful promise.97  
 
                                                 
94Id.  
95Id.  
96Id. at 2780.  
97Id.  
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Because the court found actual inducement and the evidence 
showed actual infringement by the users of Grokster’s software, the 
Court vacated the opinions of the lower courts and directed the case to 
proceed consistent with its opinion.98 
 
III. BMG MUSIC V. GONZALEZ  
 
While courts have begun to hold companies who develop file 
sharing software liable for contributory infringement, seemingly 
cutting to the source of the problem, the epidemic still exists. More 
and more file sharing networks have sprung up, and more and more 
individuals, or direct infringers, can download the latest hits in a 
matter of seconds. The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in BMG 
Music v. Gonzalez should serve as notice to consumers and those who 
participate in online file sharing activities that rightholders are now 
targeting them, and are getting results.  
BMG Music, Sony Entertainment, Inc., UMG Recordings, Inc.,  
and Atlantic Recording Corp. (hereinafter, jointly “Recording 
Companies”), brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois against Cecilia Gonzalez due to her 
alleged copyright infringement by downloading thirty songs onto her 
computer.99  Gonzalez admitted that she infringed on the Recording 
Companies’ copyrights by downloading thirty songs she did not 
own.100 However, Gonzalez claimed that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because the fair use defense was applicable to her 
situation and she was entitled to the “innocent infringer” defense with 
respect to damages.101 
Gonzalez argued that her use of the songs was “fair” because (1) 
she was sampling the music to determine which songs she would like 
to purchase; (2) she owned many of the songs she downloaded; and (3) 
                                                 
98Id. at 2783.  
99BMG Music v. Cecilia Gonzalez, 03 C 6276 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 910, *1-
2 (January 12, 2005).  
100Id. at *1-2.  
101Id. at *2.  
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she did not cause the plaintiffs any financial harm by downloading the 
thirty songs which formed the basis of the suit against her.102  
However, the court rejected her “sampling” defense , noting the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the same defense in a similar case.103 The court held 
that “the cumulative effect of direct infringers, like Gonzalez, harms 
the recording industry by reducing sales and ‘raising barriers’ to the 
recording industry’s ‘entry into the market for digital downloading of 
music.’”104  Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs on the infringement claim.105 
Gonzalez sought to go to trial on the issue of damages and 
contended that the statutory damages attributable to her were too high 
because she was an “innocent infringer.”106 In “innocent infringer” 
situations, the court may award damages of only $200 where the 
infringer proves that she “was not aware and had no reason to believe 
that . . . her acts constituted infringement.”107  However, the court 
noted that the “innocent infringer” defense is inapplicable in situations 
where a notice of copyright appeared on the recordings to which the 
infringer had access.108 Notice of the copyrights of the thirty songs at 
issue here was located on the compact discs sold in stores, not in 
Gonzalez’s possession; however, a question of fact existed as to 
whether Gonzalez had access to these discs.109 Although this question 
of fact existed, the plaintiffs needed only to prove that the notice was 
“in circulation and available to the infringer.”110 The Court then held: 
 
                                                 
102Id. at *2-3. 
103Id. at *3 (citing A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-19 (9th Cir. 
2005)).  
104Id.   
105Id.  
106Id.  
107Id. at *4.  
108Id.  
109Id.  
110Id. at *4-5.  
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[B]ecause it is undisputed that the copyrights of the 30 
 songs at issue were properly noticed on the covers of the 
 CDs, there is no question of fact as to whether Gonzalez 
 had ‘access’ to notice of the copyrights. Indeed, Gonzalez 
 (sic) admits that she and her husband have legally 
 purchased over 200 CDs. To allow Gonzalez to assert this 
 defense based on her ignorance would eviscerate copyright 
 protection and the old adage that ‘ignorance is no defense 
 to the law.’ This Court thus holds that she is not entitled to 
 the innocent infringer defense and awards the Record 
 Companies $ 22,500 (30 songs times the minimum 
 statutory penalty ($ 750)).111 
 
The relatively short District Court opinion lacks the reasoning and 
factual background of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Gonzalez.112 In 
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, readers learn that Gonzalez downloaded 
more than 1,370 copyrighted songs and kept them on her computer 
until she was caught.113 The Seventh Circuit recognized that keeping 
these songs on her computer was not a form of time-shifting in the 
likes of Sony, because “a copy of music downloaded, played and 
retained and one’s hard drive for future use is a direct substitute for a 
purchased copy without the benefit of a license fee paid to the 
rightholder.”114 The court noted that the premise of the Sony decision 
was that the broadcast was licensed for one transmission and thus one 
viewing; therefore, this “time-shifting” of this single viewing 
constituted fair use.115 
In addressing her fair use defense, the Seventh Circuit realized 
that because of the circumstances of the case, the only avenue for 
Gonzalez was to argue that her use of the songs did not affect the 
                                                 
111Id. at 5.  
112BMG Music v. Cecilia Gonzalez, 430 F. 3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005).  
113Id. at 888-90.  
114Id.  
115Id.  
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potential market for or the value of the copyrighted works.116 
Gonzalez attempted to prove that her activities were beneficial to the 
recording industry because they served as advertising for the 
rightholders.117  However, the court noted that “as file sharing has 
increased over the last four years, the sales of recorded music have 
dropped by almost 30%.”118  Faced with this statistic, the court could 
not bring itself to believe that downloading copies of copyrighted 
music constituted fair use.119 
Important to those engaged in file sharing activity is the court’s 
statement, in dicta, about the songs BMG sought compensation for. 
The court reasoned that: 
 
[A]lthough BMG Music sought damages for only the 30 
 songs that Gonzalez concedes she has never purchased, all 
 1000+ of her downloads violated the statute. All created 
 copies of an entire work. All undermined the means by 
 which authors seek to profit. Gonzalez proceeds as if the 
 authors’ only interest were in selling compact discs 
 containing collections of works. Not so; there is a market 
 in ways to introduce potential customers to music.120 
 
The court recognized that there were other options available for 
Gonzalez to sample music if she merely wanted to sample it, such as 
listening to live-stream radio over the internet and paying a fee for the 
right to do so.121 Had she done this, the court opined, the authors of the 
works would have received royalties from the broadcasters and it 
would have reduced the risk of consumers not purchasing actual music 
from a retail store.122 Also important to the court was that in these 
                                                 
116Id. at 890.  
117Id.  
118Id.  
119Id.  
120Id. at 891.  
121Id.  
122Id.  
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alternative options, the song does not remain on the listener’s 
computer.123  Therefore, the court held that:  
 
[W]ith all these means available to consumers who want 
 to choose where to spend their money, downloading full 
 copies of copyrighted material without compensation to 
 authors cannot be deemed ‘fair use.’ People such as 
 Gonzalez cannot ask courts to second-guess the market 
 and call wholesale copying ‘fair use’ if they think that 
 authors err in understanding their own economic interests 
 or that Congress erred in granting authors the rights in the 
 copyright statute.124 
 
The court then upheld the award of damages in the amount of 
$22,500 and affirmed the judgment of the lower court.  
The Seventh Circuit also upheld the District Court’s ruling on 
Gonzalez’s “innocent infringer” claim. MGM was awarded statutory 
damages on summary judgment in this case. Under 17 U.S.C 
504(c)(1), a plaintiff may recover damages between $750 and $30,000 
for each work infringed.125  Here, MGM sought the minimum $750 for 
each of the thirty songs Gonzalez downloaded, did not own, and kept 
on her computer. In rejecting Gonzalez’s argument, Seventh Circuit 
found that she was not an “innocent infringer” because one cannot be 
held to such status if a copyright notice appeared on a copy of the 
copyrighted work.126  While the downloaded songs lacked such notice, 
the Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that Gonzalez 
clearly had access to compact discs with such notices, and had she 
inquired, she could have readily found out.127 Accordingly, the trial 
court’s grant of damages on summary judgment was upheld.128 
                                                 
123Id.  
124Id.  
125Id.   
126Id. at 892.  
127Id.  
128Id. at 893.  
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While Gonzalez raises no new issues in terms of copyright law, it 
does have a few interesting comments in dicta that could serve to 
notify consumers or potential infringers exactly how this court will 
rule in the future. Matt Schruers and Jonathan Band, in their article 
BMG Music v. Gonzalez, offer three such scenarios.  
Schruers and Band argue that Gonzalez limits the landmark Sony 
case to its facts, holding that time shifting for a single use constitutes 
fair use while at the same time ignoring the fact that a great number of 
people “library” or “archive” video cassettes.129   This limitation “calls 
into doubt – at least in the Seventh Circuit – the activity of ‘librarying’ 
or ‘archiving’ video enabled by both the videocassette recorders and 
personal video recorders.”130 
Second, Schruers and Band note that the Seventh Circuit found 
that Gonzalez was not using these songs for “non-profit” use; 
however, she was not selling these songs, nor was she gaining any 
other sort of profit from them, “unless the court considers listening to 
music a ‘profit.’”131 If the court was referring to this personal use not 
equating to “non-profit educational usage,” Schruers and Band urge 
the Court to clarify its ruling in this respect.132  
Lastly, Schruers and Band criticize the Seventh Circuit’s “verbal 
attack on direct infringers” by equating downloading music to 
shoplifting.133  They note that the Supreme Court had previously 
clearly distinguished between infringement and theft because 
“interference with copyright does not easily equate with theft, 
conversion or fraud.”134  This equation by the Seventh Circuit, they 
argue, “constitutes an unfortunate trend in judicial decisions and 
                                                 
129Matthew Schruers & Jonathan Band, BMG Music, et al. v. Gonzalez, 5 E-
COM. LAW. REP. 14 (2005), available at 
http://www.policybandwidth.com/doc/gonzalez.pdf (last visited June 25, 2006).  
130Id.  
131Id.  
132Id.  
133Id.  
134Id.  
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policy discussions of blurring the significant distinctions between 
intellectual property and tangible property.”135 
Schruers and Band effectively display the importance Gonzalez 
plays not only in terms of the file sharing community, but also in terms 
of its relation to Sony. While the distinctions between the two cases 
are obvious (i.e., direct infringers vs. contributory infringers), 
Gonzalez offers a look at how courts are interpreting new P2P 
technology in relation to the Sony decision.  
 
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM 
 
A. Is New Legislation Needed? 
 
 In Sony, the District Court began its opinion by recognizing the 
importance and ramifications of the new Betamax or video-recording 
technology and refused to “undertake the role of a government 
commission or legislative body exploring and evaluating all the uses 
and consequences and the videotape recorder.”136 The court seemed to 
suggest (or cry out for) the need for legislative action or assistance, 
similar to the cry for legislative action in Wilkins when the photocopier 
made its way into the copyright arena. With the advent of P2P 
technology, a cry for help should sound from both sides of the crisis, 
and it should be heard and addressed by the legislature. This 
technology offers enormous and far-reaching (literally) benefits to its 
users; however, it has fostered a world of copyright infringement 
which continues to grow.  
 The Supreme Court accepted the time shifting argument of 
recording, watching, and erasing recorded, copyrighted materials.137 
However, does anyone – consumer, producer, copyright holder, 
Supreme Court Justice – really believe this scenario to be the norm 
amongst the video-recording public?   
                                                 
135Id.  
136Universal Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 442 
(C.D. Cal., 1979).  
137Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984). 
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 So how did the Sony Court rule the way it did? Was the Supreme 
Court searching for a reason to allow the use of this copyright-
infringing technology?  Did the Court recognize the economic impact 
it would have and find a way to keep it in the market? Did the Sony 
Court know the ends it wanted to reach, and did it search (or stretch?) 
to find the means necessary to reach those ends? When compared to 
the decisions in Aimster, Grokster, and Gonzalez, it seems the answer 
to the preceding questions is “yes.”  
 Copyright must be able to change with the advent of new 
technologies.138 “Prior to the introduction of [P2P] technology, 
copyright infringement via the Internet was arguably a manageable 
issue . . .”139 File sharing represents the latest and most pressing 
challenges to copyright law in recent years. However, courts have not 
yet been willing to embrace this new technology and allow its 
dissemination when infringement is prevalent, and with good reason. 
Gonzalez’s actions were clearly in violation of the Copyright Act and 
its purpose to protect the interests of authors, artists, and scientists in 
their original works.  
 However, Gonzalez is merely a grain of sand on the beach of 
online file sharers engaging in copyright infringement everyday. It 
would require a Herculean effort by the courts and the music industry 
to eliminate each and every individual infringer like Gonzalez. On the 
other hand, this problem cannot persist and grow to the point of 
creating irreparable harm to the music industry, record labels, and 
individual artists.  
 Perhaps Congress should act, and act now, to find a solution to 
this crisis and re-establish the balance between technological 
advancement and copyright protections. However, any Congressional 
                                                 
138Id. at 432 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 
156 (1975) (“When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, 
the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose”).  
139Robert A. Gilmore, Peer-to-Peer: Copyright Jurisprudence in the New File-
Sharing Word, the Post Grokster Landscape of Indirect Copyright Infringement and 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 5 FL. COASTAL L.J. 85, 86-87 (2004) (citing 
Wendy M. Pollack, Tuning In: Future of Copyright Protection For Online Music In 
The Digital Millennium, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2445, 2445-46 (2000)).  
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stance on the matter should be “progressive” and strong, and leave no 
room for debate.140  To be weak on the matter “would result in an 
imbalanced solution to the P2P debate and will thereby weaken the 
fundamental goals of copyright law.”141    
Much of the legislation currently proposed in Congress fails to 
adequately address the balance which is the subject of this article – 
that of rights in copyrighted material and technology.142 In 2002, 
Representative Howard Berman (D-Cal) proposed the Peer-to-Peer 
Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211). This act (1) enables copyright 
owners to use technology to deter or prevent the unauthorized 
distribution of copyrighted works over the Internet, (2) grants 
copyright holders the right to use any technology at their disposal to 
disable, interfere, or block the distribution of copyrighted works, and 
(3) limits liability for the impairment of personal computers, as long as 
the economic loss suffered by the user is less than fifty dollars.143 
Notably, Berman’s constituent base is Hollywood.144 
Berman’s proposal fails to realize how prevalent the use of P2P 
technology is today. While his proposed legislation offers a seemingly 
one-sided solution to the problem, it does not recognize the 
improbability of curtailing this widespread use. Only when the 
recording industries, internet service providers and software 
distributors come together to form a workable solution will this 
technology, and this industry, find a way to grow and prosper together.  
 
B. Alternative Compensation Schemes  
 
 This, and other proposed P2P legislation, offers a bleak outlook 
for P2P technology and the balance between this type of media 
                                                 
140John M. Moye, How Sony Survived: Peer-to-Peer Software, Grokster, and 
Contributory Copyright Liability in the Twenty-First Century, 84 N.C.L. REV. 646, 
689 (2006).  
141Id. at 689.  
142Id. at 686.  
143Id.  
144Id. (emphasis added).  
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technology and copyright sought by the Sony Court.145 What, then, are 
acceptable Congressional responses?  Alternative compensation to the 
recording industry may be one way to get around this evolving 
problem. John M. Moye argues for a “compulsory licensing scheme, 
which would set a rate at which copyrighted works would have to be 
licensed over the Internet.”146 Under this type of system, Congress 
would have the ability to guarantee compensation to copyright owners 
while at the same time allowing this information to be disseminated on 
the Internet.147 Such a solution was originally proposed for Universal 
Studios in Sony by the Ninth Circuit.148 It suggested that “a continuing 
royalty pursuant to a . . . compulsory license may very well be an 
acceptable resolution of the impasse between the VCR manufacturers 
and the film companies.”149 If Congress were to implement such a 
plan, Moye argues, it would force the two sides of the conflict to work 
together and ensure compensation to the copyright owners.150 If the 
alternative is to receive no compensation for their works, copyright 
owners may be willing to discuss such a plan.151  
 Michael Rucci, in his article entitled Congress Wants to Give the 
RIAA Control of Your iPod:  How the Induce Act Chills Innovation and 
Abrogates Sony, has proposed a different alternative compensation 
plan.152   Under his plan, he argues that because file sharing networks 
will always exist, the record labels should adjust to market rather than 
taking their aggression out on their customers or lobbying Congress to 
                                                 
145Id. at 688.  
146Id. at 689.  
147Id.  
148Id.  
149Id. (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
428 (1984)).  
150Moye, supra note 140, at 690.  
151Id. (citing Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive: Can the Recording Industry 
Survive Peer-to-Peer?, 26 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 371, 399 (2003)).  
152Michael Rucci, Congress Wants to Give the RIAA Control of Your iPod:  
How the Induce Act Chills Innovation and Abrogates Sony, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 534 (2005).  
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make changes to existing copyright law.153 One solution he cites is for 
each internet service provider (ISP) to ask their users if they want to 
pay an additional $1 per month for legal access to as many MP3s as 
they desire.154  Then, these ISPs could track downloads and distribute 
revenues directly to the artists based on their popularity.155 A solution, 
he argues, “which gives incentive to the creation of new works is not 
antithetical to the Copyright Clause and supports a free market 
economy.”156 
 Rucci’s cited alternative seems the better fit to deal with the 
evolving technologies which promote or enable copyright 
infringement. Under his plan, individuals have the option of either (1) 
being a legitimate downloader of music with unlimited access to 
copyrighted works, or (2) infringing where known avenues of 
legitimate access to music are available. Further, his plan would allow 
appropriate compensation to the authors of the copyrighted works. His 
plan is the closest step yet to achieving a workable and sustainable 
balance between technology and copyright infringement. Under either 
Moye’s or Rucci’s plans, the hope is that both sides of the conflict will 
work together to achieve a solution – a definite step in the right 
direction. 
 
C. Compulsory Alternative Compensation 
 
 Rucci’s plan offers an interesting alternative solution; however, 
perhaps a compulsory alternative compensation system for all internet 
users, the proceeds of which would be applied to offset the yearly 
losses incurred by copyright owners, could provide a more 
comprehensive – and mandatory – guarantee for copyright owners. 
According to the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), 
the recording industry loses yearly, on average, $4.2 billion worldwide 
                                                 
153Id. at 557.  
154Id.  
155Id.  
156Id.  
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as a result of copyright infringement.157 Americans – 205,326,680 to 
be exact – use the Internet.158 This number also accounts for 20.1% of 
all Internet usage worldwide.159  If all American Internet users were 
required to pay an additional $0.50 per month (half of that proposed 
by Michael Rucci) to offset the losses incurred by the recording 
industry – in exchange for unlimited Internet music access – the 
recording industry would receive $1,231,960,080 yearly. This would 
account for over 29% of all losses suffered by the recording industry 
as a result of online file sharing – more than the percentage of 
Americans using the Internet.  
    While obstacles would certainly exists in the implementation of 
any alternative compensation system, these systems seem to offer the 
simplest, and most effective, way of allowing P2P technology to 
continue while actively protecting copyrights in original works. A 
small fee for unlimited access to copyrighted works could be 
appealing to the file sharing community, especially with a guarantee 
that those users would not be subject to prosecution or liability for 
copyright infringement.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
   
 Technological advancements have forced owners of copyrighted 
material to pursue legal action against individual infringers – and they 
are getting results, evidence by the Seventh Circuit’s Gonzalez case. 
Until a solution to the file sharing problem evolves, there will continue 
to be direct and contributory infringers of copyrighted work. 
Addressing this problem, while not upsetting consumer innovation and 
the economic impact that this sort of technology can have serves as the 
greatest obstacle to come for copyright owners.  
                                                 
157Recording Industry Association of America , Issues: Anti-Piracy, 
http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp  (last visited April 19, 2006).  
158Internet World States, “Usage and Population Statistics,” available at 
www.InternetWorldStats.com (last visited April 19, 2006).  
159Id.  
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Legislation implementing an alternative compensation system 
certainly seems to be the most effective way to curtail online copyright 
infringement. However, any legislation would need to be thorough and 
address both sides of the conflict. If legislation were implemented 
which serves only to penalize individual infringers, those infringers 
would inevitably go further “underground” and seek alternative 
methods of sharing or downloading music. The public has tasted the 
benefits of online music access. Its appetite will not be easy to subdue.  
The Boston Strangler is back, and alive and well in the eyes of the 
recording and motion picture industries. While the decisions in 
Grokster, Aimster, and Gonzalez were correctly decided under existing 
law, it is the effects and benefits the public and to the motion picture 
industry derived from the Sony decision that should be the goal when 
dealing with this new dissemination technology. If the market adjusts 
and the technological advancement continues to create new avenues 
for dissemination of music and video in a profitable and legal way for 
both rightholders in copyrighted material and the public, it is hopeful 
that both sides of the conflict will be satisfied.  
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